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 1 
Summary 
The zero-rating of intra-Community acquisitions in combination with the 
deferred payment of VAT has made it possible to employ carousel fraud 
with VAT on the internal EU market. Not only are the tax authorities in the 
different Member States losing out on VAT that is not accounted for by 
missing traders, but the innocent parties in business with the missing traders 
retain a right to refund VAT, leaving the tax authority with a loss when 
refunding VAT that was never collected. Moreover, the carousel can 
theoretically keep turning an infinite amount of times and when a carousel is 
discovered, the people behind the company committing fraud are usually 
long gone. 
Member States have been trying to stop the loss of VAT by turning on the 
innocent party of the business chain, intending to hold them liable for the 
missing VAT. However, this has been stopped by the ECJ on a number of 
occasions, as the Court in its judgments has protected the innocent party in 
good faith and thus upholding the fundamental principles of law, primarily 
the principles of legal certainty and proportionality. 
The market for emission rights trading has been the primary target for VAT 
fraud in the last few years, mainly due to the high value of the emission 
rights and the fast pace of the trading on online exchange bourses. The EU 
has of late implemented temporary solutions in order to hinder the fraud on 
this market, yet the issue of VAT fraud as a whole remains to be solved. 
Due to the political complications of creating a completely harmonised 
internal market within the EU, the otherwise most effective way of ending 
the VAT carousel fraud within the Union, other solutions are debated and 
investigated throughout the EU. 
The most prominent idea is real-time VAT collection, using technological 
solutions to collect VAT right when a purchase is concluded. That way, 
companies are relieved of the VAT compliance burden, the tax authority 
will receive VAT right away and since no VAT is ever in the hands of 
anyone else than the competent authority, fraud is effectively stopped.  
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Sammanfattning 
Nollbeskattningen av gemenskapsinterna förvärv i kombination med 
uppskjuten betalning av moms har möjliggjort karusellbedrägeri med moms 
på den EU-interna marknaden. Följaktligen har medlemsstaterna drabbas av 
utebliven moms som inte redovisas av ”missing traders”, samtidigt som den 
oskyldige affärspartnern till en ”missing trader” behåller sin rätt att återfå 
moms, vilket skapar en förlust för staten i fråga som får betala tillbaka 
moms som aldrig inkommit. Dessutom kan en momskarusell i teorin snurra 
oändligt många gånger och när en karusell upptäcks har personerna bakom 
företaget som begår bedrägeriet oftast sedan länge försvunnit. 
Medlemsstaterna har försökt stoppa sina momsförluster genom att vända sig 
mot den oskyldige parten i transaktionskedjan, med avsikt att hålla denne 
ansvarig för den uteblivna momsen. Detta har dock EU-domstolen satt stopp 
för vid ett antal tillfällen. Domstolen har nämligen genom sina avgöranden 
skyddat den oskyldige parten som varit i god tro och därmed upprätthållit de 
grundläggande rättsprinciperna, främst principerna om rättssäkerhet och 
proportionalitet. 
Handel med utsläppsrätter har drabbats hårt av momsbedrägeri de senaste 
åren, mestadels med anledning av det höga värdet på utsläppsrätterna och 
det höga tempot med vilket handel på onlinebörser sker. EU har den senaste 
tiden implementerat temporära lösningar för att stoppa bedrägeri på nämnda 
marknad, men problemet med momsbedrägeri i stort kvarstår. 
På grund av de politiska komplikationerna med att skapa en helt 
harmoniserad intern marknad inom EU, vilket annars är det mest effektiva 
sättet att stoppa bedrägeri med momskaruseller inom Unionen, så debatteras 
och undersöks andra lösningar inom hela EU. 
Den mest realistiska lösningen är momsbetalning i realtid, vilket innebär att 
momsen genom tekniska lösningar betalas samtidigt som en transaktion 
genomförs. På så sätt slipper företag hantera moms, skattemyndigheten 
mottar momsen direkt och eftersom ingen moms är i händerna på någon 
annan än kompetent myndighet är möjligheterna till bedrägeri utraderade.  
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Abbreviations 
AG  Advocate General 
B2B  Business-to-business 
B2C  Business-to-Consumer 
CMR Waybill for consignments; based on the UN 
Convention on the Contract for the International 
Carriage of Goods by Road. 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
ECOFIN Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the 
European Union 
ECR  European Court Reports 
EU  European Union 
EUA  EU Emission Allowance 
ETS  Emission Trading Scheme 
HMRC  Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
MTIC  Missing Trader intra-Community Fraud 
QRM  Quick Reaction Mechanism 
RCM  Reverse Charge Mechanism 
RTvat  Real-Time VAT Collection 
RVD  Recast VAT Directive 
UK  United Kingdom 
UN  United Nations 
VAT  Value Added Tax 
VIES  VAT Information Exchange System 
VLN  VAT Locator Number 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
VAT fraud on intra-community trade, so called missing trader fraud or 
carousel fraud
1
, is of great concern for the European Union. The abolition 
of fiscal frontiers within the EU in 1993, made it easier to commit carousel 
fraud, since all the internal boarder controls were removed.
2
 Transported 
goods have thereafter only been subject to the administrative controls, but 
no physical control at EU’s internal borders.3 
In an investigation ordered by the European Commission, it was estimated 
that the VAT gap
4
 in the EU was €106.7 billion in 2006.5 Although this is 
not a completely reliable figure given the nature of fraud, the estimated lost 
VAT amounts to 12% of the theoretical VAT liability
6
.
7
 
 
One sector especially has been the target for VAT fraud in recent years, the 
trade with emission rights under the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). 
Given that emission rights are intangible property, they are particularly 
exploitable for fraudsters. Transactions are concluded fast, without any 
transportation costs or other significant handling costs. When the ETS 
frauds were discovered in late 2009, Europol estimated that around €5 
billion had been lost in the past 18 months.
8
 Furthermore, it is believed that 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this paper, carousel fraud will be used synonymously with missing 
trader fraud. 
2
 Amand, Christian. – De Rick, Frederik: Intra-Community VAT Carousels, VAT Monitor 
Jan/Feb 2005, page 8. 
3
 Amand, Christian. – De Rick, Frederik: Intra-Community VAT Carousels, VAT Monitor 
Jan/Feb 2005, page 8. 
4
 The VAT gap is the same as the VAT lost to fraud. 
5
 DG Taxation and Customs Union, Report 21 September 2009, Study to quantify and 
analyse the VAT gap in the EU-25 Member States, Reckon LLP, page 8. 
6
 The theoretical VAT liability is the VAT that would have been collected if there was no 
fraud. 
7
 DG Taxation and Customs Union, 2009, page 9. 
8
 Europol press release 9 December 2009, Carbon Credit Fraud Causes more than 5 Billion 
Euros Damage for European Taxpayers. Note that this is an estimation made by Europol 
and that there is no confirmed statistics available. 
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domestically up to 90% of the trades in carbon credits were caused by 
fraud.
9
 
 
As the values lost by tax authorities in the EU to VAT fraud is so immense, 
the EU is working hard on a solution to the problem. Possible solutions to 
the problem include the quick reaction mechanism, the reverse charge 
mechanism, structural changes to the VAT system and technological 
solutions. 
1.2 Purpose 
As the legislators work to combat VAT fraud, the methods and schemes 
used by the fraudsters become all the more intricate and branches out into 
new vulnerable markets. 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the missing trader fraud in the EU in 
general and on the market for emission rights in particular. What makes 
missing trader fraud possible under the current VAT Directive and how is it 
conducted? Why has the ETS been so heavily targeted for VAT fraud? 
How has the case law from the European Court of Justice affected the 
attempts to stop carousel fraud? 
Lastly, possible solutions to the great problem of VAT fraud will be 
addressed. Is there a means available to stop fraud within VAT, either 
through legislation, technology or can the goal be achieved through a 
combination of the two? 
1.3 Method and Material 
The method used in this paper will be a legal dogmatic method, primarily 
using laws, case law, preparatory work and doctrine as sources for the 
investigations. The most important case law will be discussed under a 
                                                 
9
 Europol press release 9 December 2009, Carbon Credit Fraud Causes more than 5 Billion 
Euros Damage for European Taxpayers. Note that this is an estimation made by Europol 
and that there is no confirmed statistics available. 
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separate section. However, cases will also be referred to under each section 
insofar as it is relevant. There will be comments and discussions 
continuously throughout the paper. Yet the main analysis and conclusion 
will be left to the end of the thesis. 
 
This thesis is directed to readers with a good understanding of VAT and 
how the EU VAT system works. Therefore, fundamental parts of the VAT 
system will not be explained in detail, nor will the terminology in most 
cases. 
1.4 Delimitation 
Due to the vastness of the area of VAT fraud, it is not possible to cover all 
the different types of VAT fraud in this paper. Focus will thus be on the 
missing trader fraud in intra-community trade. Other types of VAT fraud, 
including international and purely domestic VAT fraud will be outside the 
scope of this thesis.
10
 
The paper will primarily be written from an EU perspective. 
Notwithstanding, some of the Member States actions against, and 
experience of, VAT fraud will be drawn upon when suitable. 
  
                                                 
10
 Other types of VAT fraud include for example deducting VAT on goods for private use 
or incorrect reporting of VAT to the authorities. 
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2 Missing Trader Fraud 
2.1 The Carousel 
The basic model for carousel fraud involves three different companies 
located in two different member states. Company (A) located in Member 
State (1) sells goods to company (B) in Member State (2). This is a zero-
rated intra-community supply from (A), hence no VAT.
11
 Company (B) 
makes a regular domestic supply of the goods (charging VAT) to company 
(C).
12
 Company (B) does not account for the VAT to the tax authorities, but 
disappears (i.e. the missing trader). Company C has a right to a refund from 
the tax authority of the VAT paid to company (B). Hence, the tax authority 
loses money when refunding company (C) VAT whilst not receiving any 
VAT from company (B).
13
 
For this to be a true carousel, company (C) sells the goods back to the 
original seller, Company A in Member State (1); the carousel can then be 
repeated infinitely.
14
 
It is not uncommon for VAT carousels to include so-called “buffers” or 
“buffer companies” within the transaction chain in order to complicate the 
structure and delay investigations from the authorities.
15
 The buffer 
companies may or may not know that they are part of a carousel fraud. The 
chain of transactions can be made more intricate by adding more buffers 
spread over more Member States.
16
 By the time the authorities realise there 
                                                 
11
 RVD Art. 138(1).  
12
 RVD Art. 2(1)(a). 
13
 Memo/12/609, VAT: Commission proposes new instrument for speedy response to fraud 
– frequently asked questions. European Commission Memo 31/07/2012. 
14
 Terra, Ben. – Kajus, Julie: A Guide to the European VAT Directives, Amsterdam 2012, p. 
339. 
15
 Swinkels, Joep: Carousel Fraud in the European Union, International VAT Monitor 
Mar/Apr 2008, p. 104. 
16
 Swinkels, Joep: Carousel Fraud in the European Union, International VAT Monitor 
Mar/Apr 2008, p. 104. 
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is a VAT fraud carousel, the company which collected undue VAT has often 
disappeared, ergo the “missing trader”.17 
A carousel like the one in Supplement 1 could, theoretically, have the same 
goods go around infinite times. In this scenario, the Swedish tax authority is 
making a real loss of 23.75 for every turn of the carousel. That is the amount 
refunded to company C, the broker, and which the missing trader, company 
B, has neglected to report in. Hence missing trader fraud does not cost the 
tax authority in terms of a lost income of tax, but as an actual payout. 
Consequently, it is much more costly than for example a small domestic 
trader not reporting the correct amount of VAT. Such a situation will cost 
the tax authority since the correct amount of tax is not levied from the end 
consumer; or rather, the vendor keeps some of the VAT for himself, i.e. the 
revenue received by the tax authority is less than it should be. Comparing 
this to a VAT carousel fraud, the carousel not only means that no VAT at all 
is paid in (whereas most of the VAT is paid in the example with the small 
vendor) but also the tax authority has to refund VAT even though none has 
been paid in. This gives a double loss in a sense, both missing VAT revenue 
and refunding the VAT that was never received.  
Furthermore, once the carousel fraud is discovered and company B is 
missing, the money lost is very hard for the tax authorities to recover; 
company C is innocent and has no responsibility for the trade with the 
missing trader in terms of the VAT refunded.
18
 
 
Due to the nature of carousel fraud, goods circulating between companies 
and member states, the goods used in these schemes are preferably small but 
with a high value. This makes them easier and more inexpensive to 
transport. Typically, fraudsters have used mobile phones, computer chips or 
similar.
19
 However, there have been cases involving for example cars
20
 and, 
                                                 
17
 See Supplement 1 for an example of a simple VAT carousel. 
18
 The innocent party is in some cases liable for the VAT embezzled by the missing trader 
according to the ECJ. This is discussed in depth under 2.2 ECJ Case Law. 
19
 Memo/09/423, Commission proposal on temporary measures for a consistent response to 
carousel fraud in certain sectors – Frequently Asked Question. European Commission 
Memo 29/09/2009. 
20
 See 2.2.3 Kittel and Recolta 
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as will be expanded upon later
21
, even tradable services
22
 in the form of 
emission rights. 
The benefit of using goods of a high value is evident when looking at the 
example above. The VAT is a percentage of the price of the goods, hence 
the higher the value, the more VAT there is to steal.  
2.2 ECJ Case Law 
This section will look into the most prominent cases on MTIC from the 
Court of Justice. It is not meant to be an exhaustive recapitulation of the 
Courts decisions on the topic of VAT fraud. The cases will be handled 
chronologically in order to provide the evolution of the ECJ case law on this 
area. Only cases relevant to this thesis will be included. 
Regarding carousel fraud, the questions that have reached the Court of 
Justice have primarily been concerned with the liabilities for the innocent 
party. The rights and obligations of the innocent party involved in business 
with a fraudster will be the key issue of this chapter; however, this will also 
be connected to what Member States are allowed to do in order to prevent 
VAT fraud. 
2.2.1 Optigen, Fulcrum and Bond House 
Systems 
In the joined cases of Optigen, Fulcrum and Bond House Systems
23
 
(hereafter Optigen) the question before the Court was, in essence, whether 
or not the activity carried out in a carousel fraud was to be considered as an 
economic activity or not, i.e. a supply of goods or services within the scope 
of the RVD.
24
 
                                                 
21
 See 3. Carousel Fraud in the Emission Trading Scheme 
22
 Tradable services are, on the contrary of regular (consumed) services, not consumed 
upon purchase but can be re-traded. In that sense tradable services have the characteristics 
of goods. 
23
 Case C-354/03 (Optigen and Others) [2006] ECR I-00483. 
24
 RVD Art 2(1). 
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The companies in Optigen were innocent parties involved in a VAT 
carousel; Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) was of the opinion 
that all transactions in a chain linked to VAT (carousel) fraud should be 
treated as one. Consequently HMRC argued that the whole chain was 
noneconomic in nature, thus outside the scope of VAT. This meant that 
companies involved lost their right to deduct or reclaim VAT. 
According to AG Maduro in his opinion on the case, since VAT becomes 
chargeable on every transaction, the transactions must be regarded 
individually; ergo “the character of a particular transaction in the chain 
cannot be altered by earlier or subsequent events”.25 
The ECJ also disagrees with HMRC, clarifying that “the scope of the term 
economic activity is very wide and […] objective in character in the sense 
that the activity is considered per se and without regard to its purpose or 
result”26. Furthermore, the ECJ also disqualifies the notion that the whole 
chain should be outside the scope of VAT due to being illegal. The 
transactions made by companies that did not know and had no means of 
knowing that they were involved in the same chain as a fraudulent party still 
fulfil the criteria for taxable transactions within the RVD.
27
 
The way the ECJ stipulates that the involved parties had no knowledge of 
the fraud can be interpreted as requiring an absence of mala fides from the 
companies.
28
 
2.2.2 Federation of Technological Industries 
In Federation of Technological Industries
29
, decided by the Court just a few 
months after Optigen, the UK was involved once again. This time it was 
regarding whether or not legislation making companies with mala fides 
jointly and severally liable for payment of the VAT embezzled from their 
transaction chains. In that sense, the case is a continuation of Optigen where 
the ECJ seemed to open up for such an interpretation. 
                                                 
25
 Opinion of Mr Maduro – Case C-354/03 paragraph 27. 
26
 Case C-354/03 (Optigen and Others) [2006] ECR I-00483. Paragraph 43. 
27
 Case C-354/03 (Optigen and Others) [2006] ECR I-00483. Paragraph 51. 
28
 van Brederode, Dr. Robert F: Third-Party Risks and Liabilities in Case of VAT Fraud in 
the EU, International Tax Journal Jan/Feb 2008, p 34. 
29
 Case C-384/04 (Federation of Technological Industries) [2006] ECR I-04191. 
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Firstly, the Court discusses if such legislation is compatible with the RVD 
and finds no objections on that basis. However, such legislation must also 
be compliant with the general principles of law, more specifically the 
principles of legal certainty and proportionality in this case.
30
  
 
In essence, the court concludes that it is allowed for Member States “to 
enact legislation [...] which provides that a taxable person, to whom a 
supply of goods or services has been made and who knew or had reasonable 
grounds to suspect, that some orall [sic] of the VAT payable in respect of 
that supply, or of any previous or subsequent supply, would go unpaid, may 
be made jointly and severally liable, with the person who is liable, for 
payment of that VAT. Such legislation must, however, comply with the 
general principles of law which form part of the Community legal order and 
which includes, in particular, the principles of legal certainty and 
proportionality.”31 
Even though the Court did not accept the legislation in this particular case, it 
gives the possibility for Member States to implement similar legislation as 
long as it is compliant with the general principles of law. To what extent it 
is actually possible to create a legislation both inferring joint and several 
liability whilst upholding the principles of legal certainty and 
proportionality remains to be seen. 
2.2.3 Kittel and Recolta 
Joined cases Kittle and Recolta
32
 (henceforth Kittle) developed the ECJ’s 
case law on third party liabilities when involved in a fraudulent transaction 
chain further. In sum, it is a clarification of the Court’s jurisprudence from 
the Optigen and Federation of Technological Industries cases. The Court 
also starts out by citing Optigen to reiterate the width of the scope of VAT 
                                                 
30
 Case C-384/04 (Federation of Technological Industries) [2006] ECR I-04191. 
Paragraphs 29 and 30. 
31
 Case C-384/04 (Federation of Technological Industries) [2006] ECR I-04191. Paragraph 
35. 
32
 Axel Kittel v Belgian State and Belgian State v Recolta Recycling SPRL (Joined Cases C-
439/04 and C-440/04) [2006] ECR I-06161. 
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as well as what is “economic activities”.33 Optigen is then a continuous 
point of reference throughout the case, especially in the context of 
protecting traders acting in good faith. Federation of Technological 
Industries is also referred to when the Court states that “traders who take 
every precaution which could reasonably be required [...] to ensure that their 
transactions are not connected with fraud, [...] must be able to rely on the 
legality of those transactions without the risk of losing their right to deduct 
input VAT.”34 In the question of bad faith however, the ECJ extends the 
previous responsibility of such traders, stating that if there is bad faith the 
company is to “be regarded as a participant in that fraud, regardless of 
whether or not he profited [from it].”35 In such a case, traders in bad faith 
are viewed upon as an accomplice.
36
 
In conclusion, Kittle makes the question of good or bad faith of the 
(innocent) trader the key issue in allowing or refusing said trader, involved 
in a chain containing VAT fraud, the right to deduct his input VAT. This 
widens the VAT obligations for traders, making them to some extent liable 
for not only their own VAT, but their business partner’s VAT too. For there 
to be bad faith, it is enough that the innocent trader should have known. 
There is thus no requirement of actual knowledge.  
2.2.4 Mahagében Dávid 
The two joined cases Mahagében and Dávid
37
 are mainly concerned with 
companies’ obligation to investigate their business partner in order to avoid 
taking part in carousel fraud. 
Mahagében was accused of falsifying invoices in order to refund undue 
VAT. During an inspection, the tax authority found that there was, for 
                                                 
33
 Axel Kittel v Belgian State and Belgian State v Recolta Recycling SPRL (Joined Cases C-
439/04 and C-440/04) [2006] ECR I-06161. Paragraphs 40 and 41. 
34
 Axel Kittel v Belgian State and Belgian State v Recolta Recycling SPRL (Joined Cases C-
439/04 and C-440/04) [2006] ECR I-06161. Paragraph 51. 
35
 Axel Kittel v Belgian State and Belgian State v Recolta Recycling SPRL (Joined Cases C-
439/04 and C-440/04) [2006] ECR I-06161. Paragraph 56. 
36
 Axel Kittel v Belgian State and Belgian State v Recolta Recycling SPRL (Joined Cases C-
439/04 and C-440/04) [2006] ECR I-06161. Paragraphs 57. 
37
 Mahagében Kft v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó 
Főigazgatósága and Péter Dávid v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Észak-alföldi Regionális 
Adó Főigazgatósága (Joined Cases C-80/11 and C-142/11) [2012] Not Yet Published. 
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several reasons, no possibility that the amount of timber reportedly sold had 
actually been delivered. The company had documentation stating otherwise. 
The company was nonetheless refused deduction of VAT because the issuer 
of the invoice did not enter the purchase of the goods concerned in its 
accounts, and that, without a lorry, it was unable to deliver the goods, even 
though it stated that it had supplied the goods and met its obligations as to 
declaration and payment of the tax. The question before the court was 
whether or not it was enough that a taxable person fulfilled the material 
conditions for deducting VAT, or if the tax authority could demand some 
objective proof of the transactions actually taking place. 
Dávid was a similar case; a contractor had used a subcontractor, the 
subcontractor did not have any registered employees. Hence the tax 
authority found the invoice could not be adequately established and VAT 
thus not deducted. Another subcontractor had also been used by Dávid, but 
was now in liquidation and no records could be found. 
In essence, the court discusses how far Member states may go when using 
compliance, in particular the control of a business partner, as a means to 
stop fraud. The conclusion is that they cannot enforce upon companies a so 
far reaching obligation to investigate the honesty of the operations of the 
companies they conduct business with as the tax authorities try to claim. 
Ergo, the right to deduct VAT cannot be denied companies as in these two 
cases. 
The Court continues to follow its own jurisprudence; good faith will suffice 
for companies to remain entitled to deduct VAT irrespective of involvement 
in VAT fraud. Furthermore the companies were not deemed to be in bad 
faith because they should have known about the fraud; the possibility for 
which was opened for in Kittle and discussed above. 
 14 
2.2.5 Mecsek-Gabona 
The Hungarian company Macsek-Gabona
38
 had sold rapeseed to an Italian 
company under the VAT exempt intra-Union supply regime. However, it 
turned out later that the Italian company had been a “fake” company; its 
registered address was a person’s home and the Italian company had never 
paid any VAT. Consequently, its VAT number was removed with 
retroactive effect. On the basis of all that information, the first-level 
Hungarian tax authority took the view that Mecsek-Gabona had not 
succeeded in proving, during the fiscal procedure, that the transaction in 
issue was a VAT-exempt intra-Community supply of goods, thus incurring a 
penalty for late payment of VAT along with a tax debt. Mecsek-Gabona 
claimed to be entitled to exemption from VAT on the basis of (i) the VAT 
identification number assigned to the purchaser by the Italian tax authority, 
(ii) the fact that the goods sold had been picked up by foreign-registered 
vehicles and (iii) the CMRs returned by the purchaser from its address, 
indicating that the goods had been transported to Italy. 
The Court came to the conclusion that it is indeed possible for tax 
authorities to refuse the right to a VAT exemption on an intra-Union supply 
provided that it has been established, on the basis of objective evidence, that 
the vendor has failed to fulfil its obligations as regards evidence, or that it 
knew or should have known that the transaction which it carried out was 
part of a tax fraud committed by the purchaser, and that it had not taken 
every reasonable step within its power to prevent its own participation in 
that fraud. 
It is not however, possible to refuse the vendor this VAT exemption solely 
on the grounds that another Member State’s tax authority has retroactively 
removed the purchaser’s VAT number. 
The principle of legal certainty is once again prevailing as legal certainty is 
shown to be more important than protecting a Member States tax base. It is 
                                                 
38
 Mecsek-Gabona Kft v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Dél-dunántúli Regionális Adó 
Főigazgatósága (Case C-273/11) [2012] Not Yet Published. 
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of course more or less impossible for a company to foresee the retroactive 
removal of a business partner’s VAT number. The conditions for legislation 
on refusal of VAT deduction due to involvement in fraudulent business 
chains laid out by the Court in Federation of Technological Industries are 
not fulfilled in this case, nor were Macsek-Gabona in bad faith regarding the 
false VAT number or the trade as a whole. 
 
Both Teleos
39
 and Netto
40
 are of similar nature to Mecsek-Gabona; sales 
were made exclusive of VAT based on falsified documentation stating the 
trade was either an intra-community acquisition (Teleos) or export (Netto). 
Moreover, the sales were seemingly made ex-works in all three cases. 
Teleos and Netto were both in good faith according to the Court. 
It is worth noting that the ECJ does not discuss an extended liability to make 
sure the goods actually leave the Member State for these companies, 
regardless the sale is made ex-works. Given that the purchaser under such 
an incoterm picks up the goods at the sellers warehouse, it has all the 
characteristics of a domestic purchase. Since the seller delivers the goods 
domestically, yet invoices without VAT as an intra-Community sale, it 
would not seem unreasonable to extend his obligations insofar to ensure the 
goods are actually transported out of the Member State. If satisfactory proof 
cannot be provided by the purchaser, the seller can handle the transportation 
himself or simply add VAT to the invoice and report it as a domestic sale of 
goods. The customer can apply for the VAT back from the competent 
authority.  
 
2.2.6 Summary 
In many of the hitherto discussed cases from the ECJ, the Court narrows the 
Member States possibilities to implement measures to counter VAT fraud. 
All transactions in a transaction chain are regarded individually as far as 
                                                 
39
 The Queen, on the application of Teleos plc and Others v Commissioners of Customs & 
Excise (Case C-409/04)  [2007] ECR I-07797. 
40
 Netto Supermarkt GmbH & Co. OHG v Finanzamt Malchin (Case C-271/06) [2008] ECR 
I-00771.  
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VAT is concerned (Optigen), implementing legislation for joint and several 
liability cannot interfere with the fundamental principles of law, especially 
legal certainty and proportionality (Federation of Technological Industries). 
As long as companies are in good faith they are not liable for fraud within 
their transaction chains (Kittle) and companies have a very limited 
obligation to investigate their business partners and their transactions after 
sales (Mahagében Dávid and Mecsek-Gabona). 
These cases will of course affect the way the EU and different Member 
States work towards a solution to the problem of MTIC. The one solution 
predominantly used until now, going after the companies in business with 
fraudsters, is seemingly inadequate. Furthermore, it is to a large extent 
prohibited by the ECJ, as the case law has shown. 
There are different ways to counter VAT carousels. These will be discussed 
in length later.  
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3 Carousel Fraud in the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme 
3.1 Background 
The greenhouse effect and the danger of climate change caused primarily by 
the emission of greenhouse gases were tackled on an international scale for 
the very first time under the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was signed 
on 11 December 1997.
41
 When Russia ratified the protocol 18 November 
2004, the ninety days countdown commenced and on the 16
 
February 2005 
the protocol became binding in force for its 128 parties.
42
 Russia’s 
ratification fulfilled the prerequisites for the implementation. No less than 
55 of the Parties to the Convention, together accounting for at least 55 % of 
the total carbon dioxide emission of 1990, had to ratify before it would enter 
into force.
43
 
The European Union ratified the Kyoto Protocol on behalf of its Member 
States in 2002.
44
 Furthermore, the EU opted to use the possibility of joint 
fulfilment available in the Kyoto Protocol.
45
 In essence, this means that the 
EU has a joint responsibility to fulfil the targeted reductions of carbon 
emissions. As a consequence, the EU could redistribute the burden of 
reducing greenhouse gas emission between Member States. This 
redistribution of total emission allowed for each Member State was done 
through the Commission Decision 2006/944/EC.
46
 The modified targets set 
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42
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for each Member State are based on each states relative wealth at the time of 
the agreement.
47
 Moreover, the amended targets for each Member State are 
binding under EU law.
48
 
The Kyoto Protocol allows the trading of emission rights between Member 
States.
49
 The EU has capitalised on this possibility, creating an internal 
market for the trading of emission rights between companies in different 
Member States. 
3.2 The EU Emission Trading Scheme 
The Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is fundamental in the EU’s strive to 
combat climate change and fulfil the emission reduction targets set out by 
the Kyoto Protocol. It serves to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases 
emitted as well as redistributing the emission allowances between 
companies depending on need. 
The ETS is based upon a so-called “cap and trade” principle, limiting the 
total amount of greenhouse gas emissions within the Union in a year with a 
cap.
50
 The emission rights are tradable valuables, allowing the holder to 
emit on tonne of carbon dioxide, however, the allowances can only be used 
once and allowances have to be handed in to match the yearly emissions by 
a company.
51
 All emissions need to be covered by emission rights; if a 
company has insufficient amounts of emission rights it will be fined 
heavily.
52
 
By creating valuables of the carbon emissions, the companies involved in 
such emissions are forced to recognise the economical impact of the same; 
the environmental impact of companies’ emissions are prioritised due to its 
                                                                                                                            
Decision of 15 December 2010 amending Decision 2006/944/EC determining the 
respective emission levels allocated to the Community and each of its Member States under 
the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to Council Decision 2002/358/EC.  
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52
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economic significance. Hence, the EU (and indirectly the Kyoto Protocol) 
drives the development of carbon-efficient technology and low-carbon 
solutions forward.
53
 The environment is otherwise usually neglected by 
companies, striving primarily towards low production costs and not 
environmentally neutral solutions and the emission allowances work as a 
means to force their hands. 
3.3 VAT on Emission Allowances 
The European Commission in its VAT guidelines for emission rights 
explains that “the transfer of greenhouse gas emission allowances [...] when 
made for consideration by a taxable person is a taxable supply of services 
falling within the scope of Article 9(2)(e)
54
 of Directive 77/388/EEC. None 
of the exemptions provided for in Article 13
55
 of Directive 77/388/EEC can 
be applied to these transfers of allowances.”56 
Therefore, the seller will only charge VAT on sales of an EU emission 
Allowance (EUA), if the supply is to a domestic company. If the EUA is 
instead sold to a company in another Member State, the sale will be 
considered an intra-community supply and it is taxable where the recipient 
company has domicile. The recipient will in such a case be responsible for 
accounting for the VAT to the authorities. 
3.4 VAT Fraud on the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme 
The targeting of the ETS for VAT fraud is due to a number of factors. 
Firstly, the emission rights are intangible, consequently not in need of any 
transportation when sold. Secondly, the EUA’s are of high value, usually 
between €10 and €30, and all that is needed to trade with the EUA’s is a 
                                                 
53
 European Commission < http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm> 
54
 Article 56 RVD. 
55
 Articles 131 through 137 RVD. 
56
 TAXUD/1625/04 Rev.1 - Working paper n° 443 Rev.1, Commission guidelines on the 
application of VAT to emission allowances. 
 20 
computer.
57
 Lastly, the trades on the EUA’s transactions platform are 
cleared within fifteen minutes, making the trades very rapidly completed.
58
 
Most importantly however, the VAT treatment of EUS’s is the same as for 
goods on intra-community trade.
59
 This opens up for MTIC schemes. The 
VAT carousel used is the same as the one described under 2.1. However, the 
supply is more or less instant, on the contrary to the regular VAT carousel, 
since the goods are traded directly on the digital exchange platform. The use 
of the exchange platform for the trade makes the VAT fraud even harder to 
uncover.
60
 In 2011, around six billion emission allowances were traded on 
the EU carbon market amounting to a total value of €77 billion.61 
The complications facing the authorities, when trying to find the fraudulent 
trades on such a vast market, moving assets at such a high speed, are 
evident. 
When rumours surfaced in mid 2009 that the trading on the Bluenext
62
 
carbon exchange was driven by VAT carousel fraud, French authorities 
closed the exchange immediately. Moreover, before allowing it to open up 
again, the French authorities modified the domestic VAT regulations with 
regards to the EUA’s; domestic trades were henceforth exempt supplies for 
VAT purposes.
63
 This effectively stopped any VAT carousels in France 
from claiming undue VAT. When the exchange was once again opened, the 
daily number of EUA’s traded dropped significantly, ending up at 85% less 
than before the exchange closed.
64
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Interim measures for dealing with the MTIC on the ETS were also 
implemented by other Member States. The solutions differed between the 
Member States; the Dutch implemented a reverse charge mechanism, 
leaving the recipient liable for VAT on emission rights, applicable both on 
intra-community and domestic transactions.
65
  
In the UK, HMRC adopted a zero-rating of the supply of carbon credits 
domestically “to remain in force until an EU-wide solution is 
implemented”.66 The treatment of cross-border supplies was not changed. 
HMRC tries to justify the implemented measures, claiming that “Although 
there is currently no specific provision in EU law to introduce this measure, 
the UK Government believes that it is in the public interest that steps be 
taken now to prevent substantial potential losses to the Exchequer and to 
ensure that the legitimate market is not undermined by fraudulent trading.”67 
Romania had quite a different approach to solving the MTIC on emission 
rights, making trade with EUA’s legal only on the Romanian capital market, 
hence forcing traders to register on the capital market and comply with the 
local provisions.
68
 
Other Member States
69
 followed and implemented different temporary 
solutions to the MTIC with carbon emission allowances.
70
 
As was made clear by HMRC, the implementations made by Member States 
in order to combat VAT fraud with emission rights had no legal support in 
the RVD. Nonetheless it was deemed so important by the Member States 
they took measures regardless.
71
 The EU was never going to take action 
against the illegality of the Member States’ provisions, on the contrary the 
EU acted in order to amend the RVD in a way that would allow the Member 
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States’ provisions. Through the Directive 2010/23/EU72 which came into 
force on 5
th
 April 2010, the RVD was amended as a step in the combat 
against VAT fraud on carbon carousels. 
In a newly inserted Article, Member States are allowed to implement a 
reverse charge mechanism for allowances to emit greenhouse gases.
73
 This 
article is temporary and will only apply until 30 June 2015.
74
 
It is clear that the EU has implemented this provision in order to give itself 
time to create a more sustainable solution to the problem. Hence the limited 
time it is applicable for and the electiveness of the provision. It is noticeable 
that it took the Council almost one year to put this amendment into action. 
Naturally, the Member States could not afford to wait for the EU to act if 
the time frame was expected. However, the opposite could be the case; the 
EU took its time since the Member States already had provisional solutions 
implemented.  
Lastly, why has the EU made it optional for Member States to implement 
this anti-fraud measure? A temporary mandatory reverse charge on trade 
with carbon emission allowances would have effectively stopped the 
carousels on this market until another solution could be found by the EU. 
Instead, the RVD opens up for each Member State to implement a reverse 
charge mechanism in a way it sees fit. Rules will not only be incoherent 
across the Union, but might be non-existent in some Member States who opt 
not to employ reverse charge on carbon emission rights at all. 
Already in 2008, Germany and Austria proposed a general reverse charge of 
VAT to the European Commission, as a means to combat VAT fraud in 
general.
75
 The Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the European 
Union (ECOFIN) agrees that “the introduction of a generalised reverse 
charge would substantially reduce MTIC fraud as well as other types of 
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deduction fraud”.76 However, the negative consequences of a general 
reverse charge outweigh the positive consequences according to the 
ECOFIN: “the reverse charge would be a fundamentally different system to 
the one currently applied. It would necessitate the definition of a second 
system at an EU level and thus have negative consequences on operation of 
the internal market; it also would undermine harmonisation and possibilities 
for future improvement of the VAT system. In addition, the optional 
character of a generalised reverse-charge system has been identified as a 
cost factor for businesses and as one of the main factors creating risks of 
new types of fraud within the EU.”77 
In sum, the ECOFIN’s recommendation to the Council and European 
Parliament in this matter is “that a general reverse-charge system should 
either be introduced on a mandatory basis throughout the EU or be 
disregarded as a concept.”78 Noticeably, the exact opposite of this 
recommendation was implemented as the temporary solution to MTIC with 
emission rights, as seen above. 
In addition, when the Directive 2010/23/EU implemented the optional 
reverse charge for EUA’s, the scope of the Directive was not as wide as the 
European Commission proposed it should be. Other goods believed to be 
heavily targeted by VAT fraud was recommended to be included under the 
optional reverse charge mechanism, such as mobile phones, certain 
computer parts, perfume and some valuable metals.
79
 The issue with VAT 
fraud on those goods was thus not solved by the EU’s temporary Directive. 
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3.5 Summary 
The possibility of trading with carbon emission allowances is very 
important for the EU’s fulfillment of its Kyoto obligations. However, the 
obstacles of stopping VAT fraud are not easily solved. Before the EU 
Directive 2010/23/EU allowing the reverse charge as a temporary solution, 
Member States chose several different approaches to solve the problem. 
Other than the reverse charge, zero rating and exempting carbon emission 
allowances from VAT were methods used, to name a few. 
The Unions reluctance of applying the reverse charge mechanism for EUA 
trade is evident, not only insofar the solution has only been made a 
temporary and voluntary one, but moreover, as the ECOFIN investigation 
into the matter shows, it is too great a change of the entire VA system. 
Reverse charge is fundamentally different from the approach to VAT used 
in the RVD, hence the unwillingness of using it, even if only temporary. 
This was most definitely the reason for time limit on the abovementioned 
Directive on the matter. It may also have been the reason why the Union did 
not implement it quicker, but was hoping to solve the issue in a more 
convenient way from the beginning. Obviously, no simple solution exists. 
There are however, other possible means to solve the problem with VAT 
fraud on EUA’s. Some of these will be investigated hereafter. 
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4 Stopping the Carousel 
There are, naturally, ample of thoughts on how the issue of VAT fraud 
should be dealt with. This chapter will not be an exhaustive recapitulation of 
all the ideas on the subject, but a more focused investigation into the most 
prominent and suitable solutions chosen at the author’s discretion. 
4.1 The Quick Reaction Mechanism 
The currently available means to combat VAT fraud are insufficient for 
Member States. The possibility to temporarily employ a reverse charge 
mechanism, as discussed above, is only applicable on carbon emission 
rights for example. Consequently, VAT fraud with any other goods is 
unstoppable through that Directive. 
Article 395 RVD offers a possibility for Member States to derogate from the 
RVD in a certain aspect in order to combat fraud. However, the procedures 
of attaining the right to derogate are complex. A right to derogate “requires 
a (positive) proposal from the Commission, a process which can take up to 8 
months […] and unanimous adoption by the Council, which can lead to 
further delays”80 according to the European Commission. 
Not only is this process very slow, but a Member State also runs the risk of 
waiting for the bureaucracy for almost a year, only to have the Commission 
propose the application should not be authorised or the Council unable to 
reach a unanimous decision.
81
 
Evidently this is not a satisfactory situation for either party. This is why the 
European Commission proposed that Article 395 RVD be supplemented 
with a quick reaction mechanism (QRM), adding Articles 395a and 395b.
82
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Essentially the new articles, implementing the QRM, will speed up the 
Members States actions against fraud. Within a month the Commission must 
authorise or inform the Member State why it objects to the application.
83
 
There are certain limitations to the QRM. It is only meant to “combat 
sudden and massive forms of tax fraud in the field of VAT which could lead 
to considerable and irreparable financial losses”.84 Furthermore any such 
acts will be in force for no more than one year.
85
 
In sum, the QRM seems to be a temporary solution for Member States in 
order to use the possibility of derogation found in the old Article 395 RVD 
without the bureaucracy being an issue. After a Member State has applied 
for a temporary derogation under the QRM, it can afford to wait for up till 
ten months for a decision on the derogation in Article 395 RVD without the 
wait causing further harm through ongoing VAT carousels. 
In that sense, the quick reaction mechanism is not really a solution to 
anything, but just an extension of the red tape. 
4.2 Structural Change of the VAT System 
One possible way of solving the issue of VAT fraud is to change the very 
structure of the current VAT system. There are different ideas on what 
should be changed in order to stop the possibilities of fraud. One has to bear 
in mind however, the effect a substantial change of the VAT structure might 
have. Additional compliance and costs of compliance for companies are 
unwanted. Furthermore, reaching a political consensus on a change of the 
fundamental parts of VAT would not be easy. 
Regardless, some of the more proposed structural changes of the VAT 
system believed to solve the MTIC will be evaluated in this chapter. 
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4.2.1 The Reverse Charge Mechanism 
One way of dealing with the VAT fraud would be to apply a reverse charge 
on all business-to-business (B2B) trades. Just as is the case on imported 
goods, the reverse charge shifts the VAT liability from the seller to the 
buyer.
86
 A regular MTIC would not work under the reverse charge 
mechanism (RCM); the missing trader could not disappear with any undue 
VAT, but only without paying his own VAT debt.
87
 
Germany and Austria proposed a RCM for all B2B transactions in order to 
prevent VAT fraud.
88
 Back in 2006, Germany even applied for the right to 
derogate from the RVD and implement the RCM in respect of all B2B 
transactions in excess of €5000.89 Similarly Austria applied for the right to 
use the RCM on all B2B supplies of goods and services where the invoice 
exceeded €10 000.90 
Nonetheless the Commission would not allow Germany and Austria to 
diverge from the RVD in such a way, for a number of reasons. Firstly, such 
a change would be fundamental to the VAT system, eliminating fractioned 
payment more or less completely in these two countries. Furthermore it 
would be burdensome for taxable persons insofar they would have three 
different tax systems to abide by; the regular VAT system, the intra-
community system and lastly the proposed RCM for B2B transactions.
91
 
Lastly, the RCM is no guarantee to stop fraud. If it is only implemented on 
some of the goods most targeted by VAT fraud, the goods used for fraud is 
likely to just change. Moreover fraud is possible within the RCM system; 
since the system removes part of the companies’ liability for outgoing VAT, 
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it will most likely increase the refund claims.
92
 This is very difficult to 
control for the authorities and it is likely to lead to fraud in terms of 
excessive claims.
93
 
All things considered, the EU is reluctant to any use of the RCM as it is 
such a fundamentally different approach to VAT collecting as compared to 
the current system. Additionally, it is not a guaranteed solution, but could 
very well serve only to shift VAT fraud from one kind to another whilst 
simultaneously changing and increasing the administrative burden both for 
private traders and the tax authorities. Likewise, using the reversed charge 
to stop VAT fraud in a specific sector, such as carbon emission trading, is 
very much like treating the symptoms of VAT fraud and not the disease. 
The EU will want to find a way to solve the whole of VAT fraud, not 
moving the problem from sector to sector with insufficient temporary 
amendments to the regulations.  
4.2.2 The Flat Rate Origin System 
Proposed by the European Commission in 2008, the flat rate origin system 
is another structural change of the VAT system believed to be able to stop 
the carousel fraud within the Union.
94
 
Essentially, the flat rate origin system will make all intra-community 
acquisitions subject of a standardised flat rate VAT; the exemption on intra-
community acquisitions would be substituted with a 15% flat rate VAT.
95
  
Subsequently the purchaser will have to claim a refund from the authorities 
in the country of origin where the VAT was paid. Furthermore, the reversed 
charge mechanism will be applied on the difference between the flat rate 
15% and the domestic VAT rate in the Member State of arrival. If, by for 
example zero rating or reduced rate, the goods should have a VAT rate 
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below 15%, a credit will be given to the company purchasing.
96
 A clearing 
house will be necessary in order to transfer VAT revenues between Member 
States. 
Advantages of this system include an unaffected cost of compliance, since 
the seller would charge 15% instead of 0% and the complications of 
harmonising the VAT rates are rendered moot.
97
 
Irrespective of this, the flat rate origin system does not fix what is broken, 
but only mends it in a way to decrease the harm. The possibility to fraud is 
not removed; the scope of the fraud is only decreased to the difference 
between 15% and the domestic VAT rate in the country of arrival.
98
 Thus 
this system would serve to reduce the profitability, ergo the incentive, to use 
carousel fraud. 
This is definitely a step in the right direction, yet in essence it is much ado 
about nothing. Drawing a parallel to the fraud with emission rights 
previously discussed, it is clear that this would be of insignificant 
importance. When trades can be concluded so rapidly, it would most likely 
only increase the number of trades hence having little or no effect on the 
actual amounts lost to fraud. Lastly, as always when implementing a new 
system, there will be a considerable start-up cost for the Member States in 
order to get the new system in place. 
4.2.3 Summary 
In order to change the VAT system, a unanimous approval is needed from 
the Member States. Naturally, this makes it very complicated; irrespective 
there is a consensus that something has to be done, reaching an agreement 
on what is to be done and how is not as easy. Member States will not give 
up any of its tax basis; hence any suggested solution involving a possible 
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shift of tax basis is likely to be vetoed by the Member State losing out on 
tax income. 
Moreover, there is reluctance towards complicating compliance and 
increasing the cost of compliance for businesses. Obviously, the same goes 
for any structural changes leading to an increased administrative burden for 
the Member States. 
The most natural way to proceed is increased harmonisation of the internal 
market, creating a completely unified inner market and VAT system, 
without any differentiation between domestic and intra-community supplies 
of goods for VAT reasons. So, the structural change of the VAT system to 
be preferred is a full out harmonisation of the single market that is the EU. 
This would demand a single VAT rate throughout the Union. However, 
reaching an agreement on such a great change of the system, with the 
intrusion on the remaining tax sovereignty of the Member States on the 
VAT area, is of course a major challenge. 
All in all, solving MTIC with a structural change of the VAT system is 
complicated, both with regards to finding an actual solution to the problem 
as well as reaching a unanimous decision among Member States on actually 
implementing a new structure. It is more probable the Member States 
choose to deal with VAT fraud in a different manner. 
4.3 Technological Solutions 
The use of technology by criminals as a means to hone MTIC was made 
evident by the uncovering of VAT fraud on the greenhouse emission rights 
market. Since the technology is to some extent a party of the problem, or at 
least a catalyst, there are also suggestions on how it can be used as part of 
the solution. Technology could possibly provide an answer to MTIC without 
creating an immense administrative burden or complex and expensive 
compliance changes. A couple of ideas on how technology can be used will 
be examined and discussed hereunder. 
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4.3.1 VAT Locator Number 
The VAT locator number (VLN) is one of the proposed technologies. The 
VLN would employ a centralised computer system used by the government 
to track all transactions between traders, in order to prevent MTIC without 
the need for any fundamental changes to the current VAT system.
99
 All 
businesses would have to have a secure VLN, which would be attach to each 
invoice.
100
 If there is no valid VLN, deduction of input VAT would be 
denied. 
Each invoice would have its own unique VLN; nonetheless, from a 
compliance perspective it is believed that the process would be completely 
automatic.
101
 Thus once the system is in place it would not cause any 
noticeable inconvenience for traders from that perspective. 
However, there are downsides to the VLN solution. Firstly, it demands the 
tax authority makes a risk assessment on each transaction before issuing the 
VLN, leading to a very arbitrary decision making.
102
 Also, the point of the 
VLN is the possibility to trace individual goods by their unique number. 
Consequently, it might be too complex assort every good and maybe even 
the separate parts of every good with its own VLN; not to mention the 
problems arising for traders who keep goods in storage if all goods need to 
be paired up with a specific number.
103
 Any goods stored in bulk would be 
practically impossible to divvy up on demand; hence a line would have to be 
drawn somewhere settling to what extent goods are to be in need of a 
separate VLN or not. If VLN is to be used, it would most certainly have to 
be applied only to specific, fraud laden sectors. It would most likely be 
effective in stopping fraud in those sectors, but the risk of fraud shifting to 
unprotected goods instead is overwhelming. 
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4.3.2 Real-time VAT Collection 
The real-time VAT collection (RTvat) is, as the name implies, a shift of the 
VAT collection into real-time. The payment of VAT, as well as the right to 
deduct VAT, would be realised at the same time the transaction is paid 
for.
104
 When the actual payment is made, a technological solution would 
split off the VAT from the price paid and divert it directly to the tax 
authority; thereafter the tax authority transfers the deductable amount back 
to the bank account of the customer right away.
105
 
This would be a highly automated system and moreover, the companies 
would never be in possession of any VAT they could steal. MTIC would in 
that sense is stopped. RTvat would be an origin based system for VAT, but 
could just as well work in a destination based system.
106
 Lastly, from 
compliance perspective it would not create any additional burden for 
companies since it would all run automatically. Please see Supplement B for 
two excellent depictions of how the RTvat would work under the origin and 
destination principle, borrowed from Richard T Ainsworth’s article 
Technology Can Solve MTIC Fraud.
107
 
Nonetheless, all transactions have to be made electronically for the RTvat 
system to work; cash payments are of course outside the scope of an 
electronically handled division of the VAT part of the payment.
108
 This is 
not so much a problem for the B2B supplies as it is for the Business to 
Consumer (B2C) transactions. Most B2B transactions are made 
electronically anyway; leaving little or no change for the companies should 
this be implemented. For B2C on the other hand, cash payment is much 
more common and an abolishment of cash money is not very likely. It is 
plausible the RTvat system could be implemented only for B2B 
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transactions. It would mean some disruption in the system as far as the last 
step of the transaction chain, the B2C, is concerned, however it would be 
effective insofar as to stop the MTIC which occurs on the B2B stage of the 
transaction chain. 
4.3.3 VAT Information Exchange System 
Lastly, something has to be said on the VAT information exchange system 
(VIES). VIES is the only one of the discussed technological solutions 
actually in place already. However, it is not so much a solution as it is a 
means to exchange information in order to find and stop fraud. Its main 
function is the possibility for companies to instantly check the validity of a 
business partners VAT number.
109
 Furthermore, the member states have 
access to information regarding trader’s name and address, where the VAT 
number is applicable and the dates of issue and expiration for the VAT 
number. 
This is, naturally, a very helpful exchange of information, primarily 
beneficial for companies in letting them know if a VAT number of a 
business partner is valid or not. It does offer some protection in that sense, 
making businesses aware if a VAT number has been suspended or similar. 
That is, as long as businesses check the validity of their business partners’ 
VAT numbers on a regular basis. Most likely companies use the VIES 
before the first trade is commenced with a new business partner, whereon 
after it is assumed that the validity of the VAT number will not change. 
Furthermore, a valid VAT number does not necessarily make an honest 
trader. A VAT number can be hijacked or a carousel can be ongoing with a 
perfectly valid VAT number as long as the fraud is not uncovered. 
To conclude, the VIES does fill an important function for companies, even 
if it is not a definitive proof of companies honesty. It was never meant to 
stop MTIC, but might still help stop or uncover carousel fraud. Irrespective 
it offers a good way of exchanging information across the union. 
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4.3.4 Summary 
Technology offers cost efficient ways to deal with VAT fraud without any 
major increase in compliance for businesses. In a world that is evermore 
connected through technology, it is only natural technology can offer ways 
to stop the MTIC. There is of course always the balance of hindering fraud, 
yet not implementing a system that is too intrusive, too complex or too 
expensive. 
Of the above discussed technological suggestions, the RTvat seems the most 
viable option. It is quick, effective and it sets a stop to MTIC as the 
companies never have possession of any undue VAT. The issue of 
electronic payments only is quickly solving itself, as society moves more 
and more towards an electronic-only acceptance of payment. The people 
most keen on preserving the anonymity of cash money is to a large extent 
made up of people with untaxed funds and criminals using cash to hide their 
illegal businesses.
110
 There are also benefits for companies, including never 
having to be audited for VAT another company in the transaction chain has 
failed to account for, at the same time as the government saves massive 
amounts of money from fraud.
111
 
Richard Ainsworth argues that one of the great benefits of RTvat is its focus 
on money; ergo much of the privacy will remain intact since all a bank and 
the tax authority need to know is how much VAT is on an invoice for the 
system to work.
112
 Then again, there is always the issue of getting such a 
vast system as the proposed RTvat in place, with the cost and complications 
of setting it up as the main obstacles to surmount. However, with the 
potential benefits for the tax authorities and to some extent businesses, the 
RTvat might stand a chance. 
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5 Final Remarks 
In this final chapter, I will summarise the answers to the questions set out as 
the purpose for this thesis.  
First of all, what makes missing trader fraud possible and how is it 
conducted? The reason why it is possible to conduct VAT fraud is in 
essence the combination of a common VAT system, a common internal 
market but domestic collection of VAT within the EU. Intra-community 
acquisitions are zero-rated, but a subsequent domestic supply is not. Thus 
the self-checking mechanism of the VAT system fails as it is possible for a 
company to buy goods free of VAT from a seller in another Member State 
and sell them onwards domestically with VAT. The fraudulent company can 
then keep the VAT and disappear.
113
 Since the missing trader never intends 
on reporting the VAT, the price plus VAT is his margin and he can sell the 
goods cheaper than he bought them. This opens up for the possibility of 
innocent traders partaking in a carousel, where the company purchasing 
from the missing trader sells the goods back to the original producer in the 
other Member State and the whole process is repeated. Schemes can 
naturally be made infinitely more intricate by adding buffer companies and 
trading over more Member States. 
The reason why the emission trading scheme has been so severely affected 
by the MTIC belongs to a number of factors. To start with the emission 
rights have a high value and since VAT is calculated as a percentage of the 
value of the goods, it means more VAT to steal. Moreover, since the goods 
are intangible and traded on market exchanges a trade is completed very fast 
and without any need of transportation of goods. A carousel can potentially 
go around several times a day. Lastly, these emission rights are treated just 
as any other goods for intra-community VAT as a main rule, even if the EU 
has adopted the possibility of the reversed charge as the Member States’ 
prerogative. 
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The European Court of Justice has dealt with a number of cases both 
directly and indirectly connected to VAT fraud. The most prominent ones 
have been concerned not with the party guilty of VAT fraud, but the 
counterpart. This is natural since the one guilty of fraud is often not caught 
and when caught there is usually no need for the case to go all the way to 
the ECJ. When the guilty party cannot be tracked down however, the 
Member States have shown a keen interest in trying to hold anyone who has 
traded with the missing trader as responsible for the missing VAT in what is 
called joint and several liability. The main role of the ECJ case law with 
respect to stopping VAT fraud is the development of a far reaching 
protection of innocent parties, diminishing the Member States possibilities 
to hold innocent parties liable for lost VAT. This is mainly upheld through 
the notion that every transaction in a chain is regarded individually and 
stressing the importance and power of fundamental legal principles. 
Furthermore the ECJ has given great value to good faith and ruled out 
attempts from Member States to force companies into an investigation of 
their business partners’ legitimacy. In essence the ECJ case law has forced 
Member States away from both the idea of joint and several liability as a 
solution to VAT fraud as well as the possibility of complex compliance 
rules for companies as an answer. This more or less forces the search for a 
solution away from domestic legislation and onto an EU level. 
Indeed there is an ongoing search for a solution to the VAT fraud problem 
on an EU level; both legislative and technological ideas are evaluated. 
Personally, I believe a complete harmonisation of the inner market is the 
most sustainable solution to the VAT fraud at hand. If all trades within the 
EU were treated the same way as regular domestic trades are today, without 
any special schemes for zero-rated intra-community acquisitions and 
similar, the scope of fraud would be eradicated. The inner boarders kept 
between Member States, whilst simultaneously attempting a common inner 
market, is the only reason carousel fraud exists within the EU in the first 
place. Moreover, looking at the development of the EU up until this point, a 
completely harmonised market is the long term goal. The problem of course 
being the long term; even if the EU comes to a complete harmonisation in 
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the future it is obvious it will not happen overnight. Hence another solution 
is needed nonetheless. This is where technology comes into play. I 
personally feel that the RTvat would be the best solution out of the options 
discussed above. Not only is it a fast way to collect VAT, but since it takes 
away the possession of VAT from the companies, it is a win-win solution 
insofar as companies are relieved of the VAT compliance issues and at the 
same time the tax authority gets immediate possession of the tax money. 
There are, naturally, some downsides, especially the obstacle of cash money 
in this case. The system only works with electronic transactions, causing the 
anonymity of consumers to be destroyed. 
All in all, I would argue that the RTvat is the only viable solution available 
at the moment and until the EU has truly accomplished a unified internal 
market it would prove an excellent way of coming to terms with the MTIC. 
Regarding the anonymity issue, I cannot see why this would be impossible 
to solve with technology if people find that to be the one reason why the 
RTvat should not be implemented. Except for that one flaw, it is the only 
system which has the benefit of simplifying VAT not only for the tax 
authority, but also for the companies within the EU. Lastly, it is important to 
stress that RTvat would work without the need of legislative changes to the 
VAT system, meaning it would be both fast and relatively cheap to 
implement. 
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Supplement A 
An example of a simple VAT carousel 
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Supplement B 
RTvat under the origin and destination principle respectively.
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